




BEAUTY STEREOTYPES, SOCIAL NORM ENFORCEMENT AND MACHIAVELLIANISM



The Third-Party Punishment and Reward Game (TPRG)

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- Humans are willing to inflict punishment on those who violate the norms of cooperation and reward those who fulfil norms above expectations at personal costs (**strong reciprocity**).¹
- In experimental games attractive trustees are viewed as more trustworthy; should they fail to reciprocate however, participants inflict larger punishments on them than on less attractive cheaters (**“beauty penalty”**).²
- In bargaining situations Machiavellian people use punishment only as a means to maximize their own profit (**„strategic punishment”**).³
- Machiavellian thinking is often characterized by a **„cold” attitude**.⁴



- 1) Beauty stereotypes influence participants' *interventions*
- 2) The degree of interventions is modulated by *emotions*
- 3) The amount of High Mach participants' interventions is lower than Low Mach participants'.



Hypotheses

Participants

74 ♀ (mean age = 20.80), 72 ♀ (mean age = 21.54)

Questionnaire

- We used the Hungarian version of the *Mach-IV* questionnaire.⁵
- We applied a common practice by splitting the group at 100 points.
- Emotions were measured on a one dimensional scale from -3 (*anger*) to +3 (*contentment*).

Category	N	M	SD
Low Mach (LM) ≤ 99	64	76.5	10.69
High Mach (HM) > 100	80	105.4	12.61

Stimuli

- All manipulations were made by *Psychomorph* software.⁶
- The attractive (4 males, 4 females) and unattractive (4 males, 4 females) faces differed in *attractiveness* and *trustworthiness* ($p < 0.001$)



The TPRG

(Third-Party Punishment and Reward Game)

Two *fictitious* individuals of the same sex are playing a *Public Goods Game*



The interventions affect the players' *own account*

„Intervention panel”
Participants may choose to *punish* or *reward* either one or both players

Costly interventions
Each round 2.000 units are credited to subjects' account.
The more they punish or reward the less money they get

Two types of scenarios:

- 4 **stereotype consistent**: attractive cooperator vs. unattractive free-rider
- 4 **stereotype inconsistent**: unattractive cooperator vs. attractive free-rider


Results

1) The Effect of Attractiveness on Interventions

2 (Attractiveness: attractive, unattractive) × 2 (Strategy: cooperator, defector) repeated measures ANOVA

A significant interaction effect was found between Attractiveness and Strategy: $F(1,145) = 10.92$; $p < .002$; partial $\eta^2 = .07$

Stereotype *inconsistent* scenarios led to higher punishments and rewards.




2) Emotions Evoked by Players



2 (Attractiveness: attractive, unattractive) × 2 (Strategy: cooperator, defector) repeated measures ANOVA

A significant interaction effect was found between Attractiveness and Strategy: $F(1,145) = 9.43$; $p < .004$; partial $\eta^2 = .061$

Stereotype *inconsistent* scenarios evoked more intense emotions.



3) Machiavellian Interventions and Emotions



Independent samples t tests
There are *no significant differences* between low and high Mach participants.

Discussion

1. In this study we introduced a *new experimental game (TPRG)*. With this software we were able to investigate both sides of the strong reciprocity (altruistic punishment and altruistic reward).¹
2. Due to *higher expectations towards attractive people*, stereotype-inconsistent situations led subjects to allocate higher punishments and rewards than stereotype-consistent situations.²
3. Experienced *emotions seem to play a mediating role* in the degree of interventions.⁷
4. *High Mach participants* were not able to „detach” themselves from the emotional heat of the game. They allocated high punishments and rewards and *experienced intense emotions*.⁴

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